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It has been widely documented that the poor spend a significant proportion of their 
income on gifts even at the expense of basic consumption. We test three competing 
explanations to this phenomenon, peer effect, status concern, and risk-pooling, based 
on a census-type primary household survey in three natural villages in rural China and 
detailed household records of gifts received in major occasions. The gift giving behavior 
is largely influenced by peers in the reference groups. Status concern is another key 
motive for “keeping up with the Joneses” in extending gifts. In particular, the poor with 
sons spend more on gift giving in proportion to their income than their rich counterparts 
in response to the tightening marriage market. In contrast, risk pooling does not seem 
to be a key driver of the observed gift giving patterns. Large windfall income to a large 
extent triggers the escalation of gift giving behavior. 
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“If friends make gifts, gifts make friends.” Marshall Sahlins, 1972 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been widely documented that many of the poor spend a significant portion 
of their limited income on social spending, such as splendid funerals (The Economist, 
2007; Mango et al., 2009), roaring bride-prices and dowries (Rao, 1993; Dekker and 
Hoogeveen, 2002), lavish festivals (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007), at the expense of their 
basic nutrition intake (Deaton and Subramanian, 1996; Strauss and Thomas, 1997; Chen 
and Zhang, 2010). Peer pressures, status concerns, and risk pooling, are three notable 
explanations to this observed puzzle in the literature. 
Many of the poor live in a closely knitted community. Their behavior is deeply 
influenced by their peers in the reference group. Peer effect can generate both positive 
and negative externality. On the positive side, peer pressure may facilitate technology 
adoption and social learning (Benabou, 1993; Hoxby, 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 
2001; Conley and Udry, 2010). However, peer pressure can also induce socially 
undesirable behavior, such as Juvenile delinquency (Haynie, 2001). It is likely that one’s 
gift giving behavior is influenced by peers as well. 
Gift giving may also signal wealth and social status. If a higher social status is 
associated with greater rewards, such as higher likelihood of marriage for offspring, 
then concerns for status may intensify gift giving competition. The competitive pressure 
is especially large for the lower tail of the distribution (Deaton, 2001; Brown et al., 2011, 
thereafter BBZ) because of the unfavorable marriage market conditions for the poor. 
Gift giving behavior has accompanied human beings for thousands of years. Facing 
various natural and man-made shocks, people have used gifts giving as a means of 
smoothing shocks and mitigating risks. For example, funeral is very costly in many 
developing countries. It is hard for a family to come by the funeral expenses by itself. As 
a result, it is quite common that people extend gifts when attending funerals. The 
pooled resources can largely defray the funeral expenses. In this sense, the gift 
expenditures to others can be regarded as insurance premiums (Rosenzweig, 1988;   - 4 - 
Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Townsend, 1994). It is likely risking sharing represents 
another key motive of gift giving.  
Previous studies have investigated the behavior of gift giving separately from the 
angles of risk-sharing (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, thereafter FG), status concern and 
peer pressure (BBZ).  In this paper, we attempt to simultaneously disentangle the three 
factors using a three-wave census-type household panel dataset combined with well-
kept gift records for all households in three natural villages in rural China. 
Our datasets have several salient features. First, because we have detailed income 
and expenditure information for all the households in the sampled villages over three 
periods, we are able to measure relative social status and examine its impact on gift 
giving along a wide spectrum of income distribution. Second, the complete gift records 
enable us to match gift givers and recipients, thereby providing us with an effective way 
to identify the role of risk pooling in gift giving behavior along several dimensions. Third, 
the long-term gift records capture the dynamics of gift giving activity, such as its recent 
escalation, and the resulting large variation in reference groups across occasions and 
over time circumvents the main identification problems. Fourth, the gift records 
advance the literature on network formation through gift values, since it is often that 
relationship intensities matter more to behavior than connections themselves. 
As a preview of the main results, we find that the gift giving behavior is largely 
influenced by peers in the reference groups. Status concern is another key motive for 
“keeping up the Joneses” in extending gifts. In particular, the poor with sons spend 
more on gift giving in proportion to their income than their rich counterparts in 
responding to the increasing marriage market squeeze. In contrast, risk pooling is not a 
key driver of the observed gift giving patterns. Moreover, gift giving is largely reciprocal 
in China. After a small group of people received unexpected windfall income, they 
started to extend more generous gifts to others. Others have to follow suit, triggering 
the escalation of gift expenditure. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the patterns of gift giving in 
rural China; section 3 discusses data; section 4 lays out our basic analytical framework;   - 5 - 
section 5 discusses main issues in peer effect identification and its relevance to our 
strategy; section 6 specifies the empirical model; section 7 presents main results on the 
determinants for gift spending and its escalation; finally, section 8 concludes with 
further discussion. 
 
2. Gift Giving in Rural China 
Gift exchange is commonly practiced in developing countries but rarely 
documented in the economics literature. The Chinese society is largely relationship 
(Guanxi) based and gift exchange plays an important role in maintaining Guanxi. Gift 
giving is largely reciprocal. One is supposed to pay back previously received gifts later on 
according to the prevalent market price of gift giving.    
The analysis of gift giving in rural China is based on our surveyed villages in rural 
Guizhou (Table 1). Table 2 presents gift expenditure per occasion and the number of 
guests in come-of-age ceremonies, weddings, and funerals over time. The average gift 
size has increased steadily in all the four occasions, so is the number of guests 
participated. However, the rising gift size is not sufficient to cover the total expenditures 
in these events. As shown in Table 3 on the total expenditures for the four types of 
events, the median expenditure of come-of-age ceremony costs more than 8,000 RMB, 
while on average the host of such an event nets only 3782 RMB. In other words, the 
host has to cover more than 54% of the expenses out of his own pocket.  The gap is 
even much larger for wedding ceremonies among groom families: the amount of gift 
received accounts for only 20% of total expenditure in 2009.  
Figure 1 presents the share of gift expenditure by income quartiles over our three-
waves in China and other countries. The three dashed circles highlight our three-wave 
surveys. Over time, the share of gift and festival expenditure has increased steadily. 
There is an increasing spread in the share of gift and festival expenditure among four 
income quartiles. The poorer a household, the higher share of consumption is devoted 
to social spending, and the faster growth the share of gift and festival expenditure is 
observed between 2004 and 2009.   - 6 - 
Figure 2 plots the annual growth rates of gift spending, consumption and income 
over the period of 2005-1009. Annual gift growth rates range from 18% to 45% in three 
villages, much higher than the 10% annual growth rate of per capita consumption. While 
the share of expenditures allocated to food dropped from 48 to 42 percent, the share of 
spending on gifts and festivals soared from 8 to 17 percent. Apparently, gift spending 
escalation is an acute phenomenon in this impoverished region.  
 
3. Data Collection 
3.1 Three-Wave Census Survey 
The household information for this study comes from three waves of census-type 
household survey conducted by us in 18 selected natural villages in rural Guizhou, 
China.
1 They are both geographically isolated and ethnically diversified. Local residents 
know each other well. Most residents’ kinship networks are confined in these villages. 
More than 20 ethnic groups are living in the area, including Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and 
Yi. In total, ethnic minorities comprise about 20% of population. 
The three rounds of surveys in 2005, 2007 and 2010 cover 801, 833 and 872 
households, respectively.. The differences in sample size largely reflect demographic 
changes. All three waves include detailed information on household demographics, 
income, consumption, and transfers. Transfers include gifts received and extended.  
 
3.2 Gift-Exchange Record Collection 
Rural households usually keep the records of gift received in major occasions for a 
long period because they have to pay back accordingly when the gift givers hold a social 
event (Yan, 1996).
2 In the survey area in Guizhou, we find that all the households keep a 
gift book. We used digital camera to take pictures of the gifts recorded in the books for 
                                                 
1 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) and Guizhou University. 
2 Yan (1996) writes, “Ritualized gift giving is also associated with the custom of making and preserving gift 
lists. Gift lists are homemade books on red paper (funeral gift lists are made on yellow paper) inscribed 
with a traditional Chinese calligraphy brush. They serve as a formal record of all gifts received by the host 
of a family ceremony.”    - 7 - 
major occasions (i.e. male members’ wedding, female members’ wedding, funeral, 
coming-of-age ceremony, child birth ceremony, and house-moving ceremony) in the 
period of 2000-2009 for all the households in three natural villages in the early 2010. 
The three natural villages are selected from the eighteen natural villages (three 
administrative villages) where the three-wave census survey was conducted (Table 1). In 
each administrative village, we selected the natural village with the most centered 
location to collect gift receiving records. 
The unique Karst landform keeps the three villages isolated from the outside 
society. Among them, village 1 is the most remote (10 kilometers away from the county 
seat with poor road access), and the local custom is well preserved. To the contrary, 
village 3 is only 2.5 kilometers away from the county seat. It is the most vulnerable to 
external changes, such as the recent social spending inflation. In between, village 2 is 
populated with Buyi ethnic minority, who preserve the Catholic culture and ceremony 
tradition different from the major Han villages (e.g. village 1 and village 3). In major 
public ceremonies in village 2 people generally participate in the events (e.g. Halloween 
and Christmas) without bearing huge burden on gift exchange.
3 Since the surveyed 
villages are populated with Han group and ethnic minorities, we are able to explore 
social connections between ethnic groups. 
Based on the gift record books, we identify 335 households including 160 
households from the three natural villages and 175 households from the other fifteen 
villages covered by our large scale household survey. Once joining gift exchanges, most 
people remain active. A great proportion of previously inactive households become 
active at the end of each period. 
Figure 3 shows a map of gift network in one of the three villages. In total, 8074 gift 
links during 2000-2009 are identified among 9820 potential links. These potential links 
include all households in the hosts’ local villages and the identified links between local 
villages and other fifteen surveyed villages, whether there was a gift given. The 
assumption is that all households in the same village know each other and the dates of 
                                                 
3 A major difference in this aspect between public celebrations in India and household ceremonies in 
China can be found in Rao (2001) and Chen (2009).   - 8 - 
ceremonies. Given the geographic and local social environment, it is exactly the case. 
Meanwhile, 4611 cross-county/township gift links among 4924 potential links were 
recorded. These potential cross-township/county links include all the recorded cross-
township/county links and zero-gift-flow links between the hosts and their brides’ side 
blood relatives recalled by each household. Every effort was made to identify these 
potential but nonexistent gifts to circumvent sample attrition and sorting problem 
during our record collection process. Nearly all households’ gift-receiving records for the 
ceremonies were included in this study, since less than 5 percent households reported 
gift book loss or damage.
4 
If all family members are illiterate, a group of two or three educated relatives 
usually help record gift-giving on the celebration days. However, names on the records 
are usually nicknames which might not be precisely identified. To solve this problem, we 
showed a name list to each household to facilitate their identifying the names on the 
records.
5 We also consulted many local people to help identify the nicknames. 
Information on kinship and relatedness among villagers was also collected and 
matched to each gift link. The information was verified under the help of village leaders, 
the elderly as well as local elites. As many other rural communities, each of the three 
surveyed villages is resided with several major clans. Taking village 3 in Figure 3 as an 
example, households in the same clan usually live closer to each other due to historical 
reasons. Gift-exchanges are more prevalent within a clan than across clans. 
 
4. Risk-Pooling and Network Formation: An analytical Framework 
In the literature, most studies tie back pairwise link formation to individual 
decisions. The separability of the utility function is imposed that the utility derived from 
the network is equal to the sum of the utilities brought by each link, and these link-
specific utilities are not affected by the structure of the network. Follow the 
                                                 
4 We consulted major ceremonies with village leader and local residents to verify before going to 
individual families. Meanwhile, this prior information helped households recall and find gift books for us. 
5 Meanwhile, the name list made it easier to identify people who did not send gift to each family I visited 
and their relationships with the families, which are very important to the understanding of network 
formation.   - 9 - 
conventional setting (De Weerdt, 2004; Udry and Conley. 2005; FG, 2007), we define the 
existence of a link ( ij L ) between two nodes of distance  ij d . A link is established when 
the benefit from a link ( (, 1 ) (, 0 ) ) ij ij Bd Bd −  exceeds its maintenance cost  () ij Cd . Since 
distance does not explain all aspects of link formation, a residual ij e  exists. Specifically,  
                               1 ij L =  if [ (, 1 ) (, 0 ) ] () 0 ij ij ij ij ij ij Bd L Bd L Cd e = − = − +>                      (1) 
Social distance  ij d  involves indicators of multiple dimensions: spatial distance, 
family characteristics and relatedness, shared activities and so on. The longer the social 
distance, the less homogeneous shocks there are, and the more monitoring and 
enforcement difficulties there might exist. Therefore, both the benefit and cost of link 
formation should increase with social distance ij d , leading to a trade-off between the 
scope and ability to mutual insurance in the networks. Yet, the effect of multi-
dimensional social distance on link formation is subject to empirical investigation.  
First, income pooling should be more effective between households engaged in 
different activities/occupations, such as between farmers and non-farm migrant 
workers in our context. The former is determined by weather conditions and pest 
infestation, while the latter depends on economic prosperity and is expected to be 
uncorrelated with the former. However, households with different occupations usually 
have less common ground to socialize with each other. 
Second, taking care of kids and elderly is another form of risk-sharing than income 
pooling. Young households with children are faced with different health risks from the 
elderly and more capable of helping each other. Therefore, households with large 
difference in age structure have the potential to insure each other. However, their social 
interactions might be limited due to differences in lifestyle. 
Third, due to the potential inter-household externalities to education, links 
between the better educated and the less educated are more attractive to poor 
households than to their rich counterpart. Similarly, the poor usually have stronger 
motivation to link the rich. Since, link formation is directional and the incentives behind 
are asymmetrical, social distance should capture this trend.     - 10 - 
Kinship may strengthen link formation as it reflects history, norms and trust in a 
community. Given certain geographic closeness, blood relations facilitate punishing 
uncooperative behavior. From a Darwinist’s perspective, helping family members is a 
way to expand the gene pool. 
Level effect should also be included in the framework (1) to explore whether 
households with certain common characteristics tend to link. For instance, it is expected 
that wealthier and higher educated people tend to link each other, and households with 
higher share of the elderly/kids are less likely to link. The wealth effect is captured by 
per capita income. Because networks affect the ability to generate income, income is 
endogenous to the network and is thus instrumented in the first stage estimation.
6 
The framework to this point ignores peer influence in shaping one’s link formation 
decisions, which works in the same direction as the risk-pooling motive and may blur 
the identification. In a traditional rural society, peer influence matters as communities 
are isolated and people have close relations. 
Furthermore, the framework does not clearly consider the role of status. Unlike 
information networks, gift networks in social occasions help climbing social ladders and 
mobilizing resources in the future. The fact that status seeking works in the same 
direction as risk-pooling and peer influence makes its identification important. 
 
5. Peer Effect Identification 
Although peer effect has been studied for decades, no consensus has been reached 
on its significance and magnitude due to criticisms on identification (Manski, 1993; 
                                                 
6 Since social network affects the capability of income generation, income is potentially endogenous to 
network formation process. Households with better networks may earn higher income. Therefore, we 
instrument per capita income with variables predate the formation of gift links, including education of the 
head, size of the head’s lineal family, major family productive assets (e.g. cow, horse and farming 
machines), inherited land size, number of working members in a household, gender of the head, whether 
the head is a cadre, and shocks suffered during the year. Since income enters the dyadic regressions in 
difference and sum, we separately instrument the difference and sum in per capita income (Appendix I). 
Most instruments have strong predictive power, especially land, cow, relative network size, education and 
shocks.. Predicted sum and difference in per capita income are used in lieu of actual income in the 
estimations that follow. Predicted per capita income rather than predicted wealth is used, because it is 
believed to be more precise than an index of wealth evaluated at subjective prices, especially in the 
context that a great proportion of family assets are composed of housing.   - 11 - 
Moffitt, 2001; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Even less is known about the mechanisms 
through which it operates. Three identification challenges lay in front of peer effect 
identification: first, the reflection problem persists as people influence each other in a 
group, which hinders our judge on whether one’s action is the cause or the effect of 
peers’ actions. Therefore, identification of endogenous effect from contextual effect is 
made possible only when strong exclusion assumption is made that an influencing factor 
of individual outcomes does not indirectly affect peers’ outcomes; second, correlated 
effect confound the identification because people usually endogenously form peer 
group and /or are affected by common group characteristics (e.g. common shocks in the 
development literature and teacher effects in the studies of education) and thus behave 
similarly; third, the real group within which people interact with each other is a priori 
unknown. 
 
5.1 The Reflection Problem 
Many studies do not reliably tackle the reflection problem, leaving endogenous and 
exogenous effects entangled in the peer effect estimation. Among the two effects only 
the endogenous effect can generate social multiplier with policy implications, therefore 
studies never give up finding effective solutions. 
The most frequently utilized way to isolate the two effects is to instrument peers’ 
behavior with their lagged behavior (Hanushek et al., 2003) or the lagged treatment 
they received (Boozer and Cacciola, 2001). The reflection problem can also be mitigated 
by specifying a non-linear setting other than the linear-in-mean model (Manski, 1993; 
Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Recently, Bobonis and Finan (2009) attempts to apply an 
instrumental strategy that isolates endogenous effect under a partial-population 
experiment setting that directly affect the behavior of some but not all group members. 
More recent studies also utilize network information or partially overlapping groups to 
circumvent the reflection problem (De Giorgi et al., 2010). 
Since peer groups are perfectly overlapped across individuals in the standard 
framework, it is difficult to distinguish endogenous effect from exogenous effect   - 12 - 
(Manski, 1993). Our paper takes lagged median behavior of the group by occasion to 
break down the reflective influence and utilizes detailed network information to 
disentangle endogenous effect. Meanwhile, an alternative framework presented in this 
paper adopts individual-specific peer groups based on one’s gift receivers. Since 
households in the villages sometimes attend different social events, this guarantees the 
existence of excluded peers that are not in one’s group but are in the group of one’s 
peers. De Giorgi et al. (2010) show how this within-group variation enables us to identify 
endogenous effect even without an instrumental variable approach in absence of 
correlated effects. Adopting the same logic, Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) releases the 
excluded peers’ requirement by the assumption that strength of the interactions 
declines with distance in the network, and the identification is still achieved. 
 
5.2 Correlated Effects 
To separate peer effect from correlated effects, some studies use randomly 
assigned peers (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003), some use conditional variance 
restrictions that disentangle excess variance due to peer effect from that due to group-
level sorting (Graham, 2008), and some use composition variations of adjacent cohorts 
within schools to identify peer effect (Hoxby, 2000; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2008; 
Ammermuller and Pischke, 2009). 
Similar in spirit to Hoxby (2000) and Gibbons and Telhaj (2008), our peer effect 
identification utilizes variations in the size and composition of guests attending each 
social event. The longitudinal structure of the data allows us to track each household’s 
previous peers and distinguish between new peers and old peers. The large variations in 
group size and that new peers account for a great proportion in each occasion provide 
us a chance to reliably identify peer influence. However, the presence of correlated 
effects in this study may come from two sources: unobservable group shocks and 
endogenous group formation. 
To tackle the first issue of common unobservable shocks, we apply an instrumental 
variable approach where lagged all peers’ median gift per occasion in the groups is   - 13 - 
instrumented with median gift per occasion from out-of-township new peers. The 
surveyed villages are isolated from outside towns due to the unique Karst landform. On 
the one hand, the geographic distance limits the spread of common shocks and 
information sharing, which mitigate the concern for common unobserved factors. 
Information sharing is further restricted due to the fact that in the patrilineal culture 
fellow villagers attending male side ceremonies have little connection with brides’ 
external relatives. On the other hand, new peers’ median gift per occasion is highly 
correlated with that of all peers by construction. The two nice features of out-of-
township new peers create a good instrument. 
To mitigate the concern for self-selection into gift groups, reference groups are 
defined in line with village boundaries and brides’ external blood relatives’ network. The 
traditional patrilinear culture and land allocation system in rural China determine that 
most males stay in birth villages, while most females migrate out upon marriage. Brides’ 
blood relatives are usually invited to attend major occasions. Since local geographic 
isolation from outside restricts social connections, most out-of-township new peers are 
brides’ blood relatives. Meanwhile, all households in each village know each other and 
social events well due to close local connections for generations.  
Based on these facts, only brides’ external blood relatives among these new peers, 
whether they sent gifts or not, are included to construct the instrument. With the help 
of gift record, we are able to figure out local villagers who sent gift as well as who could 
but did not. All fellow villagers and brides’ out-of-township blood relatives, whether 
they present gifts or not, are included in the peer group that defines the instrumented 
variable, which circumvents the endogenous group formation that confounds the 
identification of peer effect. 
Similar to the robustness check in Dercon and Broeck (2007), group characteristics 
are controlled to further test the possibility that individuals endogenously sort 
themselves into groups due to certain unobservable characteristics or abilities. 
The remaining potential problem of correlated effects arising from unobserved 
individual and group effect is taken care of in our longitudinal fixed effect estimations.   - 14 - 
 
5.3 Reference Group Definition 
In the literature, the definition of peer groups varies substantially, from the most 
comprehensive national population to the very restrictive grade cohorts. Besides the 
level and degree of social interactions specific to the context and social mechanism, the 
large variations in the definition reflect how hard it is to establish who influences whom 
a priori. Most studies do not have that information due to data limitation and /or a 
thorough understanding of the specific context and social mechanism. Instead, they 
assume individuals in the population (sometimes partitioned into schools or villages) as 
potential peers and define peer influence based on average intra-group externality that 
affects group members identically. Another strategy is to pick at random many sets of 
potential peers to build a simulated likelihood (Mihaly, 2007). 
In our study, the local unique karst landform facilitates well-defined reference 
groups in the context of isolated rural communities. Gift record during social events 
provides us a good chance to study the social mechanism of peer effect. Comparing 
kernel density estimates among social events, gift spending in each social event clusters 
round a different level, suggesting peer influence works through information sharing 
during occasions.
7 Therefore, in our main estimation reference groups for gift spending 
are defined according to gift presenters in each occasion. 
However, this definition leads to largely overlapping peer groups. Borrowing from 
recent studies that utilize rich information on social networks to construct individual-
specific reference groups (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Lin, 2010), 
we define reference groups for gift spending based on gift receivers to whom one 
presents gifts per year. This definition provides partially overlapping peer groups, since 
households sometimes attend different social events. A comparison of estimates from 
                                                 
7 Most residents give gifts in events held in their natural villages. They do share information on the gift 
price per occasion. On the day of a ceremony, it is often that an educated person is responsible for 
keeping the record of gifts received. As a result, the market information on gifts giving is largely a 
common knowledge within a village.   - 15 - 
the two peer group definitions tells us if peer pressure is more intense from fellow gift 
presenters or from gift receivers. 
 
6. Empirical Strategy 
6.1 Model Specification 
Our main empirical estimations are dyadic regressions. In network analysis, a dyad 
is a pair of agents. Dyadic data contains two types of information: link attributes  ij w  
between nodes i and  j  and node attributes  i z  and  j z  for nodes i and  j , respectively. 
Therefore, the data is normally transformed into level effect ( ij zz + ), social distance 
( ij zz − ) and link attributes  ij w  to best preserve information.
8 Since gift exchanges are 
directional, i.e. the outcome variable  y  need not satisfy  ij ji yy =  for any i and  j . 
Follow FG identification, let 
,,, 0 1 ,,, 1 2 , , 3 , , 4 , ,,, ,,, [ ]( )( ) i jct i jct it jt it jt it i jct i t i jct y m y z z z z RD w αα α α α ψ φ −− =+ − + + + + +γ + + + ε  (2) 
where -i denotes peers.  ,,, i jct y  is the actual gift guest ipresented to the host  j  in an 
occasion c at time t.  ,,, i jct w  denotes link attributes between i and j at ceremony c and 
time t, such as ceremony type, cross village or not, and blood relations.  , it z  and  , jt z  
respectively denote attributes of household i and j at time t.  1 α  identifies peer influence 
imposed on guests presenting gifts per occasion. 
2 α  and  3 α  are combined to test the risk-pooling motive:  2 α  identifies social 
distance effect, while  3 α  identifies level effect. The two effects are controlled to 
eliminate the concern that apparent assorting on gift exchange could only be due to the 
similarities in preferences being associated with closeness. A set of household factors 
are included to construct social distance and level effect indicators, including head 
characteristics (gender, marital status, education, age and ethnicity), family 
                                                 
8 Our conditional dyadic fixed effect model assumes conditional independence for consistency, which 
means that gift-giving decisions are independent from each other conditional on all explanatory variables 
and node-specific unobserved factors.   - 16 - 
characteristics (share of youth and the elderly, cadre, household size, land size, family 
assets, number of farm workers and non-farm worker), and major household shocks 
(natural disaster, livestock death and family member death). 
However, the FG link formation framework (1=link exists; 0=link does not exist) 
conveys no information on how the intensity of a link is determined. The strength of 
links in many contexts is what really matters to an individual’s well-being. It shows to 
what extend one can rely on networks when needed, rather than the mere existence of 
links could do. Therefore, we substitute actual gift one presents in an occasion for link 
existence as the dependent variable. 
From the econometric identification perspective, FG estimations could not reliably 
identify level effect as the degree for a directional link from i to  j  is either 0 or 1. 
Though social differences in attributes between observations are identified, FG 
illustrates that low degree variation hinders the effort to identify determinants of more 
links, i.e., the level effect  3 α . Combined with the dependence of dyadic observations, 
the issue is that joint likelihood of the sample cannot be decomposed into a product of 
single observation likelihoods. To the contrary, link intensity based on gifts amount 
provides much larger variation. Therefore, linear dyadic model on gift spending per 
occasion is estimated to circumvent the issue of indecomposable dependent dyadic 
observation likelihoods. 
As discussed in section 5, peer effect is identified via an instrument variable 
approach. In the main estimations, lagged median gift spending per occasion from 
brides’ out-of-township blood relatives, whether they sent gift or not, instruments 
lagged all peers’ median gift spending per occasion. Adopting a non-linear peer 
influence setting, i.e., lagged median behavior among peers, partially overlapping 
groups over time and across occasions mitigates the reflection problem that confounds 
peer effect. 
Out-of-township peers circumvent the concern for correlated effects that arises 
from common unobservable shocks. All fellow residents within the village boundaries 
and all brides’ out-of-township blood relatives, whether they present gifts or not, are   - 17 - 
included in the peer groups to mitigate another concern for correlated effects due to 
self-selection into gift groups. 
The unique karst landform facilitates well-defined reference groups in the context 
of isolated rural communities. It is very likely that peer influence over gift spending in 
social events works through information sharing during each occasion. Therefore, in our 
main estimation reference groups for gift spending are defined according to fellow gift 
presenters in each occasion. To compare sources of peer pressure, we also define peer 
groups for gift spending based on gift receivers to whom one presents gifts per year.  
To test FG’s predictions on risk-sharing, throughout the dyadic estimations we 
construct social distances and level effects as FG’s setting. We improve upon FG via 
disentangling peer effect and status seeking from risk-pooling motive. Moreover, we 
directly explore determinants of link intensity using long-term complete real gift 
networks. To the contrary, FG explores determinants of nominated informal insurance 
groups followed by estimating whether it predicts a small number of short-term 
transfers and loans in the real world. 
The status seeking motive is captured by the individual-specific Deaton relative 
deprivation index (Deaton, 2001), the normalized difference between the average 
income of those with higher income and an income level x weighted by the proportion 
of those with income higher than the corresponding individual i. It is valued between 0 
and 1. The more relatively deprived, the higher it is valued.
9 This is an improvement 
over BBZ that uses community-specific distributional indicators to measure status 
seeking. 
Compared to BBZ, we further isolate the risk-sharing motive from status seeking 
and more rigorously identify peer effect. While BBZ restricts peer groups at the village 
boundary without over time variation in their composition, our long-term detailed 
information on gift record leads to household-specific variation in peer group over time 
and across events. As discussed earlier, this variation helps circumvent the reflection 
problem. Moreover, our instrument mitigates correlated effects that confound peer 
                                                 
9 For a detailed review of a series of relative deprivation measures, please refer to Chen and Zhang (2011).     - 18 - 
influence due to unobserved common factors and / or self-selection into groups, while 
BBZ does not implement an instrumental variable approach. 
The main specification (2), however, does not directly account for the recent gift 
escalation. Manipulating the dyadic observations to difference between each pair of 
households with zero and nonzero gift exchanges in both directions,
10 the pairwise 
difference model (3) investigates how the incremental gift spending can be interpreted 
by three major factors: risk-sharing, changes in status and changes in peer influence. 
The pairwise difference model removes the unobserved pair heterogeneity. Let 
,, 1 ,, 1 2 , , 3 , , 4 , ,, [ ]( )( ) ijt ijt it jt it jt it ijt y m y z z z z RD α ααα −− ∆ = ∆ + − + + + ∆ +∆ε                (3) 
To check whether peer effect is robust to alternative IVs, we follow IV strategy in 
De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) that uses changes in peers’ windfall income and 
remittance to instrument changes in peers’ median gift per occasion. Changes in peers’ 
windfall income should directly affect peers’ gift spending and only exert indirect impact 
on one’s gift spending growth via peer influence. 
 
6.2 Dependence of Dyadic Observations 
Due to the presence of node-specific characteristics common to all links containing 
that node, dyadic links are not independent. The non-independence feature can be 
expressed as  ,, ( , )0 ij ik E εε ≠ ,  ,, ( , )0 ij ki E εε ≠ ,  ,, ( , )0 ij kj E εε ≠  and  ,, ( , )0 ij jk E εε ≠  for all k. 
Conventional OLS estimation generates consistent coefficient but inconsistent standard 
errors. Monte Carlo simulations show that the corrected standard errors can be much 
larger, especially when the average links for nodes is large (FG, 2007). 
Three general categories of approaches have been utilized to tackle the 
dependence of dyadic observations. The first category is to run the GLS estimation while 
assuming some form for the covariance matrix. However, the method has not been as 
thoroughly worked out as panel data (Simpson, 2001). 
The second category of approaches is to correct for the understated dyadic p-
values or standard errors. The conventional method have one dimension to be clustered, 
                                                 
10 We restrict our dyadic links to (potential) links between households who once held social occasions.   - 19 - 
while for dyadic data we need to simultaneously cluster two dimensions, gift presenters 
and gift receivers. Three corresponding methods are developed in this category. First, a 
multi-way clustering method is developed to allow arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
intra-group correlation in distinct non-nested categories (Cameron et al., 2006; 
Thompson, 2009). Though applied in some setting with  ,, ( , )0 ij ik E εε ≠  or 
,, ( , )0 ij kj E εε ≠ , the clustering does not consider  ,, ( , )0 ij ki E εε ≠  and  ,, ( , )0 ij jk E εε ≠ . A 
second method, Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP), is widely utilized in the 
sociology literature. QAP uses permutation methods to adjust p-values, but it relies on 
bootstrapping (Simpson, 2001; Santos and Barrett, 2010). The third method corrects 
dyadic standard errors due to the cross-observation correlation in error terms involving 
certain individuals (FG, 2007). Therefore, it more thoroughly adjusts for dependence of 
dyadic observations. 
The third category uses individual fixed effect to purge out the unobserved 
attributes (De Weerdt, 2004; Udry and Conley, 2005). For the dyadic data, the dyadic 
fixed effect model involves putting in a dummy variable for each gift presenter and gift 
receiver. However, a large set of dummies often leads to inefficiency or substantive 
parameters without estimation when the covariate does not vary much along a 
dimension. Meanwhile, fixed effect may not handle some forms of correlated errors 
(Thompson 2009). Another limitation with dyadic fixed effect is that they limit the set of 
covariates that can be included due to collinearity. Fortunately, the long term network 
record and dispersed gift spending along both dimensions allow us to identify the 
parameters with a large set of dummies. 
Though all the three methods are effective in their own ways, there still is an 
assumption that the error terms of two dyads containing no mutual members are 
uncorrelated. We release this assumption in the robustness check through clustering 
the observations by time periods. 
In this paper, we estimate dyadic regressions across all possible dyads using De 
Weerdt dyadic fixed effect correction (De Weerdt, 2004), FG standard error correction 
(FG, 2007) and QAP (Simpson, 2001). The absence of some dyadic observations is   - 20 - 
perfectly predicted by never holding any ceremonies in the past few years and/or not 
knowing each other across villages. Therefore, there is no point including those pairs in 
the estimation. All estimations are based on a NxN square adjacency matrix composed 
of (potential) pairwise connections among ceremony organizers. Through this survey 
design, square adjacent matrices are built.
11 
To implement De Weerdt dyadic fixed effect correction, a set of dummy variables is 
introduced, one for each household in the sample indicating whether a household is 
involved in a pair. Every row of the data contains two dummies equal to one. Combined 
with the observable attribute variables, the set of dummies controls the unobserved 
attributes left in the error term. 
The FG standard error correction uses the following formula to correct covariance 
matrix for the coefficient estimatesβ . N denotes number of dyadic observations, and K 
is the number of regressors.   X is the matrix of all regressors, and  ij X is the vector of 
regressors for dyadic observation ij. We have  1 ijkl m =  if ik = , jl = , il =  or  jk = , and 0 









ij ij kl kl
i jkl
m




= = = =
=
− ∑∑∑∑  
To implement QAP, the dependent variable is permuted and merged back with the 
independent variables. During repeated permutations, values sharing a row/column in 
the original data will share a row/column in the permuted data. Therefore, we preserve 
any dependence among elements of the same row/column but eliminate any 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Then we 
run the estimation with the new merged data set and repeat the permutation and 
estimation to generate an empirical sampling distribution. If the actual coefficient is at 
an extreme percentile of the distribution under the null, we can reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
11 This strategy is consistent with the standard social network survey that asks each respondent to identify 
a list of other households on which one could rely in case of need or to whom one gives help when called 
upon to do so.   - 21 - 
7. Empirical Results 
7.1 Determinants for Gift Spending Per Occasion 
In Table 4, three standard error corrections are adopted in the dyadic estimation of 
determinants for gift spending. R1 adjusts for standard errors according to FG. We find 
incomplete risk-pooling: households do not purposefully insure along occupation (non-
farm work and farm work), while they significantly insure each other according to 
income profile and weakly along education and shock dimensions. Level effects show 
more intense gifts among cadres, the educated and the same occupation. Families with 
unmarried son are motivated to link each other in exchange for insurance against large 
expenses in future weddings. Gift-giving is more intense between lineal relatives. Given 
lineal relative relationship, we find significantly less gift spending per occasion across 
villages, suggesting that intra-village social links are valuable. It also means that 
monitoring and enforcement difficulties dominate the concern for risk-pooling.
12 
13 
Peer influence is salient, with a 1% higher peers’ gift spending per occasion leading 
to 0.24% more in gift-giving per occasion. Consistent with BBZ, status seeking is more 
intense for the lower tail of the distribution. The lowest ranked households spend 33% 
more on gift per occasion than their highest ranked counterpart. 
The QAP estimation in R2 presents similar results. The differences lie in insignificant 
gift insurance against shocks and little level effect of occupation and education. The 
estimated peer effect is 0.23%, and the lowest ranked households have a 38% higher 
gift spending per occasion than the top households. 
In R3, we report the De Weerdt dyadic fixed-effect estimations. New findings 
emerge: Younger families send more gifts to households with senior members.
14 Richer 
households exchange more gifts among themselves. 1% higher median gift spent per 
                                                 
12 Our estimation of geographic proximity might be more reliable, since variations in geographic distance 
is larger in our dataset capturing numbers of cross-village links, while this type of link is absent in FG. 
13 There is a concern that households may self-select into a neighborhood. However, historically evolved 
locality of farm land in rural China prevents endogenous household placement. See Figure 3 for the typical 
pattern of household geographic clustering based on inherited farm land in each clan. 
14 Unlike other studies using household head age, our family demographic structure indicators in terms of 
share of the elderly and share of the unmarried son are controlled. The latter more directly captures 
potential complements in taking care of the elderly and insuring against lump-sum wedding expenditure 
for unmarried son, respectively.   - 22 - 
occasion in the peer group leads to 0.48% more own gift spending, a magnitude larger 
than in R1 and R2. The lowest households spend 67% more on gifts per occasion than 
the top ones. 
 
7.2 Determinants for Changes in Gift Spending per Occasion 
Having presented the determinants for gift spending in an occasion, however, 
driving forces for the recent escalating gift spending are not directly addressed. In this 
subsection, we attempt to explore this issue. The estimation methods in R1-R3 in Table 
5 correspond to R1-R3 in Table 4, respectively. 
The evidence for risk-pooling on gift spending escalation is largely insignificant. We 
find risk-sharing responding to shocks only in R1 and that village cadres send more gifts 
to ordinary villagers in R1 and R2. Health and weather shocks smoothing and income 
pooling are even of the opposite sign in R3, suggesting that poorer households suffering 
from more shocks purposefully connect richer counterparts with rapid growing gifts. 
Under R1, gift spending among families with unmarried son or senior members 
experiences a higher increase. Throughout the three scenarios we do not observe gift 
escalation caused by risk-sharing across occupations. 
The marginal peer effect is much larger in promoting gift escalation than in 
explaining gift spending itself. A 1% growth in peers’ gift spending increases own gift 
expenditure per occasion by 0.74% under FG correction, 0.77% under QAP, and 0.62% 
under De Weerdt correction. 
Being more deprived in social ladders boosts gift growth. A 1-point increase in the 
Deaton relative deprivation index, i.e., from the bottom to the top in the distribution, 
causes a 44% higher increase in gift spending per occasion under FG correction, a 40% 
higher increase under QAP estimation, and a 55% higher increase under De Weerdt 
correction. 
Following the IV strategy in De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), we use changes in 
peers’ windfall income and remittance to instrument changes in peers’ median gift per 
occasion and conduct four robustness checks (Table 6). The F-statistic for the first stage   - 23 - 
estimations demonstrates that the alternative IVs have large predicting power, while 
the p-values for Hansen J-statistic suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
just-identified. All four estimations on changes in gift expenditure with alternative IVs 
confirm peer effect and status seeking. 
First, pairwise difference models are estimated with the two alternative IVs. The 
identified marginal peer effects are 1.20% under FG correction, 0.76% under QAP, and 
0.68% under De Weerdt correction. The identified status seeking effects are 0.54% 
under FG correction, 0.41% under QAP, and 0.55% under De Weerdt correction. All 
identified peer effect and status seeking are of high significance. 
Second, instead of defining one’s fellow gift presenters in each social event as 
peers, we identify peers as a set of gift receivers for each household over a year.
15 We 
conclude that peer pressure in extending gifts comes both from fellow ceremony guests 
and event organizers. The identified peer effect is 0.78%, closer to the QAP scenario and 
lying in the middle of the three pairwise dyadic regressions. The status seeking effect is 
1.15%, which is larger than any of the three pairwise dyadic regressions.  
Windfall income in our context includes two exogenous sources: resettlement 
subsidy targeting dilapidated houses and vulnerable habitats as well as land acquisitions 
subsidy due to urbanized projects near the local county seat. Both sources of income 
survive the test of their association with observable family characteristics (Appendix II), 
which suggests that they are largely random to household characteristics. To mitigate 
endogeneity that drives the effect of remittance on gift-giving, it is defined to be sent 
from household members migrated for at least two years. 
In the first stage estimations for both pairwise dyadic regression and household 
fixed effect regression, changes in peers’ median windfall income significantly predict 
changes in peers’ median gift per occasion, while remittance sometimes demonstrates 
significant impact. 
                                                 
15 The median values are taken for a set of own gift sending links per year (i.e., the left hand side) and a 
set of all peers’ gift sending links per year (i.e., the right hand side). The resulting dataset has one 
observation for each household per year, and a household fixed effect model is estimated that regresses 
median own gift per occasion within each year on median peers’ gift spending per occasion. The model 
gets rid of the household unobserved factor(s) that may result in inconsistent estimation of peer effect.   - 24 - 
There is no windfall income sharing mechanism in the eighteen villages. Therefore, 
changes in peers’ windfall income should only exert indirect impact on own gift growth 
via peers’ gift expenditure and their influence over own gift spending, generating 
spillover effect. The resettlement subsidy and land acquisitions subsidy are supposed to 
fulfill specific objectives. However, gift spending seems to be very responsive to these 
income sources, possibly due to the wealth effect that triggers gift escalation. 
Rapid economic development in rural China continues to bring large windfall 
income opportunities, and at the same time rising wage in recent years may increase 
remittance. If these incomes are unevenly distributed, it is very likely that gift expenses 
escalation spill over to the communities with a disproportionate impact on the poor.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Lavish household social spending has been widely observed, this paper studies the 
impoverished context where people spend heavily on gifts at the expense of basic 
consumption. Complementary to the literature that studies the determinants of total 
household social spending, we stick to the micro foundation of the behavior - how own 
gift spending in an event responds to relative status, peer influence and potentials to 
pool risks. 
Our results confirm the prevalence of peer influence and status seeking motive in 
shaping gift spending escalation. The two effects persist upon applying different dyadic 
standard error corrections, adopting alternative instrument variables, changing 
reference groups from fellow ceremony guests to event organizers, controlling group 
characteristics that may correlate with network formation and own gift giving, and 
clustering by year to further deal with link dependence. 
However, our results suggest incomplete risk-sharing to maximize potential gains 
from informal networks. Specifically, risk-sharing is only consistently observed via 
income pooling, but it is not evident via occupation diversification, education, shock 
smoothing and so on. Moreover, none of the above social distances accounts for the 
recent gift escalation.   - 25 - 
One standard interpretation is that network maintenance cost in some dimensions 
is too high to sustain. Another plausible reason is that gift spending during social events 
is associated with status awards. Therefore, we observe that lower ranked households 
are more motivated to invest in gifts. In particular, households with unmarried son tend 
to extend gifts, but the reverse is not true. It is hardly surprising when the marriage 
market in China is tightening and favorable to girls. The pressure to build bigger houses, 
bid up bride price, and throw larger wedding banquet to improve their sons’ likelihood 
of marriage drives them to invest early in the market. 
The capability and motives for gift-giving is amplified due to massive windfall 
income and other opportunities amid the rapid development in China. Though received 
by some households, they spill over to peers and contribute to the escalating gift 
expenditure. For instance, the passage of Lewis turning point means significant rising 
wages in the labor market (Zhang et. al., 2010), which coincides with the inflating cost of 
ceremonies. Meanwhile, official subsidies have been implemented over the past five 
years, such as direct grain subsidy since 2005 and lumpy land acquisitions subsidy due to 
the accelerating urbanization process in rural China. 
The challenge is to minimize the negative externalities caused by peer influence 
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Data source:  World Bank, 1988-2005; Author's Three-Wave Census Data in Rural Guizhou; Rao(2001)
by Income Quartiles in Rural Areas
Gift and Festival Expenditure Across Countries
 
Notes: 1. The categorization for rural China (rCHN1, rCHN2, rCHN3, rCHN4) is based on the same four quartiles as other datasets, i.e. less than $1 per day 
(denoted as “1”), $1-$2 per day (denoted as “2”), $4-$6 per day (denoted as “3”) and $6-$10 per day (denoted as “4”). The poverty lines are adjusted according 
to 2005 PPP rate from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. 
2. Notation: CHN: China, Gua: Guatemala, INDU: India-Udaipur, INDO: Indonesia, INDK: India-Karnataka, COTE: Cote d'Ivoire, MEX: Mexico, NIC: Nicaragua, PAK: 
Pakistan, PAN: Panama, PAPU: Papua New Guinea, SOU: South Africa, INDH: India-Hyderabad. “r” denotes rural area. 
3. The dashed circle and the arrow show rapid increase in the share of gift and festival expenditure in our three-wave Guizhou survey. 
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      Source: Gift record data (2005-2009) and three wave survey data. 
      Notes: Annualized growth rates have adjusted for inflation based on recent years’ China Statistics Year 
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Figure 3 Dyadic Links and Gift Exchange Networks 
 
Source: Authors’ social network data from one of the three villages. 
Note: Dots of the same color show households in the same clan. Dots to the boundaries show households from other villages. The dots (households) are based 
on actual geographic locations.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics by Natural Village (2009) 
    Village 1  Village 2  Village 3  Total 
Total number of households  48  27  80  155 
Total population  203  96  295  594 
Distance to the county seat (km)  10.0  11.0  2.5  7.8 
Per capita cultivated land (mu)  0.87  0.16  1.10  0.71 
Share of flat land (%)  40.0  20.7  80.0  53.4 
Male head of household (dummy)  93.5  94.8  91.6  92.8 
Education of household head (years)  2.87  3.06  3.98  3.44 
Minority head of household (dummy)  2.9  90.1  5.9  18.9 
Share of household members aged 11-29, unmarried (%)  15.9  15.7  14.7  16.6 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%)  14.2  17.9  12.5  14.1 





Table 2 Gift Spending and Sizes of Ceremonies (2000-2009, per Occasion) 
Year 
Come-of-age  Male Wedding  Female Wedding  Funeral 
Mean gift 
(RMB) 












Gift SD  Mean 
# guests 
2000-2004  28.8  18.1  35.5  41.7  20.3  31  41.6  21.1  22  23.5  17.2  31 
2005  25.1  12.3  34  45.9  27.2  38  -  -  -  28.7  17.4  49 
2006  27.6  8.0  41  55.4  29.4  34.3  58.1  24.7  31  21.8  13.3  61.9 
2007  46.6  27.8  46  50.5  25.9  40  53.3  24.1  26.3  -  -  - 
2008  -  -  -  53.6  34.8  35.5  59.7  29.2  36  83.4  42.1  56 
2009  73.3  41.6  51.5  90.6  52.3  37.3  68.4  39.7  45  37.9  23.6  75.5 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
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Table 3 Median Expenditures (RMB) in Organizing Major Ceremonies (1996 – 2009) 
Year  Come-of-age  Wedding (Groom's Family)  Wedding (Bride's Family)  Funeral Expenditure 
1996  -  4500 (3.00)  3157 (2.10)  2688 (1.79) 
1997  -  3852 (2.84)  3100 (2.29)  3471 (2.56) 
1998  -  5211 (3.85)  3025 (2.23)  3170 (2.34) 
1999  -  3634 (2.64)  3829 (2.79)  4328 (3.15) 
2000  -  6250 (4.85)  2929 (2.27)  4393 (3.41) 
2001  -  7371 (5.81)  5644 (4.45)  3388 (2.67) 
2002  -  7347 (5.20)  4536 (3.21)  3402 (2.41) 
2003  -  7891 (6.22)  5143 (4.05)  4655 (3.67) 
2004  -  10423 (8.24)  4243 (3.35)  6150 (4.86) 
2005  3208 (1.95)  9486 (5.76)  7633 (4.63)  5156 (3.13) 
2006  3387 (2.62)  11805 (9.14)  7502 (5.81)  6175 (4.78) 
2007  4284 (2.75)  8569 (5.50)  4927 (3.16)  8096 (5.20) 
2008  8046 (5.50)  13983 (9.56)  5833 (3.99)  7561 (5.17) 
2009  8154 (5.51)  15066 (10.18)  7766 (5.25)  7151 (4.83) 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: [1] All spending have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistic Year Book published by NBS. All values are in RMB. [2] Recall data on 
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Table 4 Dyadic Regression on Gift Expenditure per Occasion 
 




Procedure (p-value)  
De Weerdt (2004)  
SE correction 
Social Distances (def(Zi , Zj))     
Cumulated shocks  -0.178**  (0.08)  -0.319  (0.20)  -0.131*  (0.08) 
Head minority status  -0.028  (0.06)  -0.019  (0.47)  -0.233  (0.49) 
Household size  0.089**  (0.04)  0.049*  (0.09)  -0.069  (0.08) 
Number of farm workers  0.047  (0.04)  0.031  (0.25)  0.081  (0.17) 
Number of  non-farm workers  -0.024  (0.02)  -0.018  (0.37)  -0.032  (0.06) 
Head education  -0.026*  (0.02)  -0.022  (0.18)  -0.040  (0.03) 
Head gender  -0.072  (0.19)  -0.081  (0.35)  -0.422  (0.41) 
Cadre  0.237  (0.15)  0.233*  (0.08)  -0.207  (0.19) 
Head marital status  0.086  (0.12)  0.083  (0.31)  -0.086  (0.31) 
Head age  0.010***  (0.00)  0.010**  (0.02)  0.071**  (0.03) 
Share of the elderly  -0.239  (0.18)  -0.269  (0.16)  -1.054**  (0.44) 
Share of unmarried son  -0.135  (0.15)  -0.155  (0.15)  -0.099  (0.29) 
Per capita income (predicted, log)  0.468***  (0.13)  0.617**  (0.02)  0.245***  (0.03) 
Level Effect (sum(Zi , Zj))     
Cumulated shocks  0.057  (0.05)  0.040  (0.27)  0.084  (0.06) 
Head minority status  0.067  (0.10)  0.076  (0.26)  1.779***  (0.54) 
Household size  0.065*  (0.04)  0.075**  (0.03)  0.112  (0.07) 
Number of farm workers  0.067*  (0.04)  0.037  (0.24)  0.021  (0.06) 
Number of  non-farm workers  0.039**  (0.02)  0.044  (0.18)  -0.114*  (0.06) 
Head education  0.019*  (0.01)  0.016  (0.23)  0.050*  (0.03) 
Head gender  -0.050  (0.08)  -0.037  (0.38)  -0.002  (0.38) 
Cadre  0.261**  (0.10)  0.274*  (0.07)  0.282  (0.18) 
Head marital status  -0.061  (0.06)  -0.059  (0.39)  -0.638**  (0.30) 
Head age  0.001  (0.01)  0.001  (0.40)  -0.047  (0.03) 
Share of the elderly  0.388**  (0.17)  0.369  (0.11)  0.409  (0.45) 
Share of unmarried son  0.320**  (0.12)  0.321**  (0.05)  0.310*  (0.17) 
Per capita income (predicted, log)  0.109  (0.17)  0.073  (0.31)  0.775***  (0.08) 
Link Attributes             
Lineal relatives or not  1.611***  (0.12)  1.757***  (0.00)  1.550***  (0.13) 
Across villages or not  -2.430***  (0.16)  -2.297***  (0.00)  -1.778***  (0.09) 
Peer Influence     
Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, 
log) 
0.241**  (0.12)  0.234**  (0.04)  0.480**  (0.23) 
Status Seeking     
Deaton Relative Deprivation  0.337*  (0.19)  0.375**  (0.04)  0.671***  (0.15) 
R2 / N  0.442 / 3136  0.446 / 3136  0.519 / 3136 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in R1 and R3, and QAP p-values are reported in R2. * 
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Table 5 Pairwise Dyadic Regression on Changes in Gift Expenditure per Occasion 
 





De Weerdt (2004)  
SE correction 
Social Distances (def(Zi , Zj)) 
Cumulated shocks  -0.179**  (0.07)  -0.101  (0.18)  0.47**  (0.21) 
Head minority status  0.226***  (0.04)  0.139*  (0.06)  -1.208  (0.84) 
Household size  0.024  (0.02)  0.016  (0.25)  0.052  (0.08) 
Number of farm workers  0.012  (0.01)  0.010  (0.32)  0.014  (0.02) 
Number of  non-farm workers  0.002  (0.02)  0.001  (0.46)  0.088  (0.06) 
Head education  -0.010  (0.01)  -0.005  (0.36)  -0.015  (0.04) 
Head gender  -0.035  (0.07)  -0.025  (0.40)  -2.452  (1.53) 
Cadre  0.259***  (0.09)  0.128*  (0.15)  -0.056  (0.26) 
Head marital status  0.097  (0.06)  0.058  (0.31)  -0.109  (0.38) 
Head age  0.002  (0.00)  0.001  (0.39)  0.016  (0.02) 
Share of the elderly  0.061  (0.11)  0.048  (0.36)  0.445  (0.54) 
Share of unmarried son  -0.147**  (0.06)  -0.092  (0.21)  0.093  (0.36) 
Per capita income (pred, log)  0.248  (0.16)  0.137  (0.30)  -0.834**  (0.40) 
Level Effect (sum(Zi , Zj)) 
Cumulated shocks  -0.021  (0.03)  -0.002  (0.51)  0.055  (0.08) 
Head minority status  -0.155***  (0.04)  -0.083  (0.11)  -2.281**  (0.92) 
Household size  -0.057***  (0.02)  -0.031*  (0.06)  -0.043  (0.08) 
Number of farm workers  0.031*  (0.02)  0.031  (0.23)  0.025  (0.02) 
Number of  non-farm workers  -0.042**  (0.02)  -0.022  (0.14)  -0.094  (0.06) 
Head education  0.016*  (0.01)  0.011  (0.15)  0.014  (0.04) 
Head gender  -0.168**  (0.07)  -0.092  (0.13)  -2.627***  (1.02) 
Cadre  -0.211***  (0.07)  -0.133*  (0.07)  0.038  (0.21) 
Head marital status  0.096  (0.06)  0.060  (0.25)  -0.050  (0.36) 
Head age  -0.003  (0.00)  -0.001  (0.33)  -0.023  (0.03) 
Share of the elderly  0.223**  (0.10)  0.145  (0.14)  0.812  (0.52) 
Share of unmarried son  0.158**  (0.06)  0.107  (0.15)  0.363  (0.33) 
Per capita income (pred, log)  0.012  (0.05)  -0.016  (0.43)  0.199*  (0.12) 
Change in Peer Influence 
Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, 
log) 
0.736***  (0.13)  0.767***  (0.00)  0.621***  (0.09) 
Change in Status Seeking 
Deaton Relative Deprivation  0.438**  (0.21)  0.397***  (0.00)  0.554***  (0.13) 
R2 / N  0.18 / 3136  0.11 / 3136  0.21 / 3136 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in R1 and R3, and QAP p-values are reported in R2.  
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Table 6 Pairwise Dyadic Regression on Changes in Gift Expenditure with Alternative IV 
(Changes in peers’ windfall income and remittance as IVs) 
  marginal effect  standard error 
Pairwise Dyadic Regression - Second Stage 
1.Pairwise Difference Model (under FG standard error correction) 
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  1.200***  (0.35) 
Δ Deaton Relative Deprivation  0.538***  (0.19) 
2. Pairwise Difference Model (under Quadratic Assignment Procedure)  
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.761***  (0.00) 
Δ Deaton Relative Deprivation  0.414***  (0.01) 
3. Pairwise Difference Model (under De Weerdt standard error correction)  
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.683***  (0.13) 
Δ Deaton Relative Deprivation  0.551***  (0.20) 
Pairwise Dyadic Regression - First Stage 
1
st stage:  Δ peers’ windfall income (lag, log)  0.071***  (0.02) 
                  Δ peers’ remittance (lag, log)  0.013  (0.19) 
F-statistic for joint significance   19.28 
p-value for Hansen J-statistic  0.26 
 
Household Fixed Effect Regression - Second Stage 
4. Household First Difference Model (DV: average gift per occasion in each year; gift receivers as peers) 
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.779**  (0.34) 
Δ Deaton Relative Deprivation  1.149***  (0.41) 
Household Fixed Effect Regression - First Stage 
1
st stage:  Δ peers’ windfall income (lag, log)  0.134***  (0.03) 
                  Δ peers’ remittance (lag, log)  0.085***  (0.03) 
F-statistic for joint significance   15.58 
p-value for Hansen J-statistic  0.35 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in scenarios 1 and 3 in the second stage, and scenario 2 in the 
first stage reports QAP adjusted p-values. Scenario 4 reports robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The instrument variables strategy in all scenarios follows De 
Weerdt and Dercon (2006) except that we adopt a more exogenous remittance definition that is only 
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Appendix I Instrumenting Income 
  sum of per capita income  difference in per capita income 
  All regressors as sums  All regressors as differences 
land (mu)  0.02***  0.02** 
  (0.00)  (0.01) 
machine (dummy)  -0.23***  0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.18) 
cow (#)  0.05***  0.11*** 
  (0.01)  (0.03) 
horse (#)  -0.06  0.06 
  (0.04)  (0.13) 
Hhsize (# members)  -0.07***  -0.15*** 
  (0.01)  (0.02) 
network size (# lineal relatives, log)  1.22***  0.13 
  (0.20)  (0.61) 
edu (years)  0.01**  0.08*** 
  (0.01)  (0.02) 
sex (dummy)  -0.16***  0.31** 
  (0.05)  (0.15) 
cadre (dummy)  -0.04  -0.49*** 
  (0.04)  (0.12) 
shocks (# times)  -0.19***  -0.14*** 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Year dummies  Y  Y 
Village dummies  Y  Y 
r2  0.83  0.45 
N  7239  7239 
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Appendix II-1 Summary Statistics for Windfall Income & Non-earned Income 
Year  Mean*  Median*  Sd*  N* 
  Direct grain subsidy (targeting grain growing area) 
2004  -  -  -  - 
2006  24.67857  20.5  9.81  14 
2009  120.5333  90  62.57  105 
  Remittance (from hh members migrated for at least 2 years) 
2004  1385.588  980  686.47  34 
2006  3357.313  2000  1685.53  67 
2009  3635.147  3000  2656.85  68 
  Resettlement subsidy (targeting dilapidated houses and vulnerable habitats) 
2004  -  -  -  - 
2006  441.1692  396  321.01  13 
2009  902.5333  600  678.51  15 
  Land acquisitions subsidy (targeting hhs involved in projects near county seat) 
2004  -  -  -  - 
2006  8896  10000  5548.74  5 
2009  60147.5  55000  35341.32  18 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
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Appendix II-2 Windfall Income and Family Characteristics 
  I  II  III  IV 
   resettlement subsidy (Logit)  land acquisitions subsidy (Logit) 
lrmrelatives_normcenvill  0.00  0.01  -0.09  -0.07 
  (1.00)  (0.77)  (0.54)  (0.50) 
hhsize  0.02  0.02  0.40  0.40 
  (0.93)  (0.90)  (0.45)  (0.31) 
shrmigr  -1.08  -0.76  1.81  3.62 
  (0.45)  (0.58)  (0.52)  (0.24) 
sex  -1.00  -0.91  -0.72  -0.65 
  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.49)  (0.23) 
minority  -0.54  -0.21  -1.21  0.73 
  (0.46)  (0.67)  (0.35)  (0.41) 
edu  -0.02  0.00  -0.07  0.26 
  (0.84)  (0.95)  (0.82)  (0.17) 
cadre  0.69  0.62  0.31  0.42 
  (0.26)  (0.30)  (0.22)  (0.24) 
age  0.04  0.03  0.22  0.15* 
  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.12)  (0.06) 
shelder  -1.75  -0.50  -5.24  0.26 
  (0.19)  (0.67)  (0.36)  (0.93) 
shyouth  0.54  2.22**  -0.03  0.76 
  (0.61)  (0.02)  (0.99)  (0.81) 
land  -0.01  -0.04  0.28  -0.01 
  (0.85)  (0.56)  (0.24)  (0.96) 
cow  0.02  0.16  -1.66  -0.02 
  (0.95)  (0.55)  (0.19)  (0.98) 
horse  -0.01  -0.14  -0.21  -0.32 
  (0.99)  (0.88)  (0.36)  (0.71) 
shocks  -0.40  -0.25  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.54)  (0.70)  (0.99)  (1.00) 
Year Fixed Effect  Y  N  Y  N 
Village Fixed Effect  Y  N  Y  N 
Pseudo R2  0.157  0.077  0.379  0.245 
N  616  616  607  609 
Notes: Resettlement subsidy targets dilapidated houses and vulnerable habitats due to natural disaster. 
Land acquisitions subsidy targets households affected by public construction projects near the local 
county seat. 